Δευτέρα 4 Ιουλίου 2016

The limited role of exchange rates in export competitiveness

In the ‘currency wars’ discussion, it is almost taken for granted that exchange rate depreciations will result in non-trivial export gains. Using evidence from countries in Europe and Asia, this column argues instead that factors unrelated to prices/exchange rates often play a predominant role in shaping trade developments. Moreover, these factors affect export outcomes in a very diversified manner across countries, in part because of the interplay of global value chains.

In the ‘currency wars’ discussion – including, for instance, Blanchard (2016) – it is almost taken for granted that exchange rate depreciations will result in non-trivial export gains. As we all know, this is not so straightforward and this column’s contribution is to show that non-price/non-exchange rate factors play a critical and often predominant role in shaping trade developments. Moreover, the size of the non-price component is proven to be highly heterogeneous across the developed and emerging economies that we have examined. This suggests more attention should be paid to the empirical evidence before engaging in discussion – or actually fighting wars – over currencies.

The analysis is conducted here using methodologies of decomposition of the export market shares developed in a series of papers by Benkovskis and Wörz (2014, 2015), within the Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet). There are two novelties we bring in this column with respect to that work: (i) calculations are updated to 2014, and (ii) selected European and Asian countries are used as a case in point.

The puzzling starting point

When thinking about the exchange rate as a driver of export results, the first obvious thing to do is to check whether increasing price competitiveness following depreciation is correlated with higher market shares, and vice versa after an appreciation. Figure 1 shows the well-known, but often forgotten fact that for most countries this is not the case. Cumulated market shares are hardly related to changes in price/exchange rate competitiveness (here proxied by relative export prices, or RXP).1 If price competitiveness were a reliable covariate of market share, there should be a clustering of points in the NW and SE quadrants, i.e. higher (lower) market shares (on the y-axis) are associated with worsened (improved) price competitiveness. This, however, is not the case as points are scattered around, indicating that a host of factors are at play. Also, this result consistently holds for large sets of countries regardless of the periods under observation (see di Mauro and Foster 2008 for an analysis pre-Crisis), as well as in a variety of set-ups (e.g. Berthou et al. 2015, and Berthou and di Mauro 2015 using firm level data).

Figure 1. Market shares and price competitiveness, 2000-2014 (annual average changes)

Δευτέρα 19 Οκτωβρίου 2015

«Η μεταρρύθμιση αυτή θα γίνει, τέλος»

«Τρεις όρους έθεσα στον Σρέντερ, απεριόριστη πρόσβαση στο αρχείο του, απεριόριστη πρόσβαση σε πρωταγωνιστές της εποχής του και συναίνεσή του να ανοίξουν οι μυστικοί φάκελοι –και της ΣΤΑΖΙ– που τον αφορούσαν. Συμφώνησε και στα τρία χωρίς “εάν” και “εφόσον”».

Ο καθηγητής Νεότερης Ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Ερλάνγκεν, Γκρέγκορ Σέλγκεν, που έγραψε τα παραπάνω, είναι από τους Γερμανούς ιστορικούς που δεν συμβιβάζονται με αγιογραφίες. Γνώστης, όσο ουδείς άλλος, της γερμανικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής μετά τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, μόλις εξέδωσε την 1.038 σελίδων βιογραφία του πρώην καγκελάριου της Γερμανίας, Γκέρχαρντ Σρέντερ, του πολιτικού του οποίου η πολιτική δράση συνδέθηκε με την αλλαγή του γερμανικού κοινωνικού μοντέλου.

«Δεν συζητάμε» είχε προειδοποιήσει ο Σρέντερ (σ.σ. καλό θα είναι να το λάβουν υπόψη τους οι Ελληνες πολιτικοί) «για τη διανομή περισσευμάτων. Νέα αιτήματα δεν είμαστε σε θέση να ικανοποιήσουμε. Ισως θα πρέπει, αν θέλουμε να διατηρήσουμε σταθερή ευημερία, βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και νέα δικαιοσύνη, να περιορίσουμε κάποιες απαιτήσεις και να διαγράψουμε άλλες, που μπορεί πριν από μισόν αιώνα να φαίνονταν δικαιολογημένες, ωστόσο σήμερα έχουν χάσει τον λόγο ύπαρξής τους». «Με αυτό τον τρόπο», γράφει ο Σέλγκεν, «παίρνει διαζύγιο ο 7ος Γερμανός καγκελάριος και οι πολίτες της ενωμένης Γερμανίας από την ομοσπονδιακή Γερμανία του Κόνραντ Αντενάουερ και του Λούντβιχ Ερχαρντ».

«Το φαΐ των παιδιών μας»


Παρασκευή 24 Ιουλίου 2015

Top 5 Things A Capitalist Should Tell A Socialist

As more Bernie Sanders fans crawl out from the woodwork, its crucial that free marketeers be armed and ready to fight the socialists with the truth of liberty and personal freedom.

When arguing with a socialist, its important to listen, smile, nod, pet their pretty little heads every once in a while, but to ultimately not to put up with any of their authoritarian b.s. and to have talking points ready to fire back at their pretty little tyrannical faces. Here are 5 of those potential talking points:


1. Your iPhone was made by a corporation

Isn’t the free market just terrible? Steve Jobs was a person. That person created Apple. Apple is a corporation. And that evil, greedy corporation created the iPhone that all socialists want to burn, but can’t because they love their Instagram pics just a little too much. They’ll still tweet about how much they hate capitalism from their tablet devices brought to them by… capitalism.

Κυριακή 4 Ιανουαρίου 2015

What happens when a country bankrupts

The Economist explains

FROM the days when monarchs over-borrowed for their mercantile adventures, to Argentina’s recent failure to pay its creditors, countries have long run into trouble paying back what they have borrowed. Spain’s 16th-century king, Philip II, reigned over four of his country’s defaults. Greece and Argentina have reneged on their commitments to bondholders seven and eight times respectively over the past 200 years. And most countries have defaulted at least once in their history. But what precisely happens when countries stop paying what they owe?


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